CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-STANDING-TAXPAYER'S STANDING LIMITED TO CONGRESSIONAL AcTIONs AUTHORIZED BY THE TAXING AND

PowEt-Valley Forge ChristianCollege v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State Inc., 102 S. Ct. 752

SPENDING

(1982).
The issue of a taxpayer's standing to object to an expenditure of
funds by the federal government has been in a state of flux since the
landmark decision of Flastv. Cohen,' which granted taxpayers standing to contest expenditures allegedly violative of the establishment
clause of the first amendment. 2 In what can be viewed as an attempt
by the Burger Court to further limit the scope of taxpayer standing,
the Supreme Court of the United States held in Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc. 3 that a taxpayer may contest violations of the establishment
clause only when the challenged congressional action has been taken
pursuant to the taxing and spending clause of article I, section 8 of the
4
United States Constitution.
In Valley Forge, respondent-taxpayers challenged a governmental conveyance of federal property, as authorized by the Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (the Act), 5 to a
religiously affiliated educational organization. The Act authorizes the
federal government to transfer surplus property8 to private or public
entities 7 with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
1 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Standing is derived from the cases and controversies clause of the
United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See infra notes 31-39 and accompanying text. For an introduction to the standing requirement, see generally Berger, Standing to Sue
in PublicActions: Is It a ConstitutionalRequirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 601 (1968); Jaffe, Comment: Standing Again, 84
HAnv. L. REv. 633 (1971).
- The establishment clause provides: -Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ....
U.S. CONs?. amend. I. For background to the establishment clause, see
Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to ParochialSchools, 56 CALM. L. REv. 260 (1968);
Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HAnv. L. Rrv. 1680 (1969); Hitchcock, The
Supreme Court and Religion: Historical Overview and Future Prognosis, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J.
183 (1980).
3102 S. Ct. 752 (1982).
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. "The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts ....
""Id.
40 U.S.C. § 471 (1976). The declared policy of the Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act is "'to provide for the Government an economical and efficient system for (a) the
procurement and supply of personal property and nonpersonal services.... ; (b) the utilization
of available property; (c) the disposal of surplus property; and (d) records management." Id.
a Surplus property is defined in the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act as
any excess property not required for the needs and the discharge of the responsibilities of all
Federal agencies, as determined by the Administrator." 40 U.S.C. § 472(g) (1976).
40 U.S.C. § 484 (1976).
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(HEW)8 assuming responsibility for surplus real property to be used
for educational purposes.9 Surplus property may be transferred to a
nonprofit, tax-exempt educational institution; the purchase price may

be discounted by taking into account any benefit accruing to the
federal government' 0 as computed by a "public benefit allowance."'-I
In August, 1976, HEW, as authorized by the Act, transferred

seventy-seven acres of land, including the buildings and fixtures
thereon,'2 to Valley Forge Christian College. 13 The Valley Forge
Christian College is a nonprofit educational institution devoted to the
study of the Bible and to the preparation of its students for Christian
service as ministers and laypersons, which purposes are reflected in its
degree programs.14 The college mandates daily attendance at chapel
service and participation in "Christian activities" by all students.' 5
The Secretary of HEW determined a 100 % public benefit allowance with the result that the seventy-seven acre tract, worth $577,500,
was conveyed to the Valley Forge Christian College without any
payment by that educational institution.'6 The college was required,
however, to agree to use the property for thirty years for certain
8 The authorization of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to dispose of surplus
real property to be used for educational purposes has since been changed to the Secretary of
Education. 20 U.S.C. § 3441(a)(2)(P) (1976 and Supp. III).
- 40 U.S.C. § 484(k)(1) (1976).
40 U.S.C. § 484(k)(I)(A),(C) (1976).
34 C.F.R. § 12.9(a) (1981) provides that:
[t]ransferees shall be entitled to a public benefit allowance in terms of a percentage
which will be applied against the value of the property to be conveyed. Such an
allowance will be computed on the basis of benefits to the United States from the use
of such property for educational purposes.
Id.
12 The property at issue in this action was once part of a 181 acre tract on which the
Department of the Army had built the Valley Forge General Hospital to provide medical care for
the armed services. The hospital, in use for 30 years, was closed at the instance of the Secretary of
Defense in April, 1973, as part of a program "to reduce the number of military installations in
the United States." 102 S. Ct. at 756. Thereafter, the property was declared to be surplus by the
General Services Administration. Id.
,3Valley Forge Christian College was known as the Northeast Bible College at the time of
the conveyance, Id. at 756 n.6. The college is associated with a religious society known as the
Assemblies of Cod. Id. at 756.
14 Id; see also Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc. v. United States
Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 619 F.2d 252, 253-54 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 102 S. Ct.
752 (1982).
'5 Brief for Respondents at 5, Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief for
Respondents]. Much of the "Christian activities" consisted of work with drug addicts and
alcoholics and with mentally and physically handicapped children. Reply Brief for Federal
Respondents at 3 n.2, Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982).
18102 S. Ct. at 756. The Government regularly gave a 95% to 100% public benefit
allowance to these religious organizations. Americans United for Separation of Church and
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educational purposes' 7 or the property would revert back to the federal government.' 8
Upon learning of the transfer of this property through a news

release,' 9 Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.
(Americans United)20 and four of its employees brought suit in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and contending that the
conveyance of land to Valley Forge Christian College violated the
establishment clause of the first amendment. 2' Americans United
and the individual plaintiffs brought suit as taxpayers of the United
States.2 2 The District Court granted summary judgment for the college holding that Americans United did not have standing to sue as
taxpayers.2 3 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
agreed that Americans United probably lacked standing to sue as
taxpayers;2 4 however, the court held that the organization had a
personal stake in the protection afforded by the establishment clause
by virtue of their separationist views and therefore had standing as
citizens to bring this action. 25 The Supreme Court of the United
State, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 619 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir. 1980),

rev'd sub nom. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982).
" 102 S. Ct. at 756. Pursuant to 34 C.F.R. § 12.9(c) (1981), transfers are subject to certain
conditions, two of which are that "It]he transferee will be obligated to utilize the property
continuously in accordance with an approved plan of operation," and Ithe transferee will file
with the Department [of Education] such reports covering the utilization of the property as may
be required." Valley Forge Christian College represented that it would augment its arts and
humanities curriculum and that it would provide counselling for the inner cities. 102 S. Ct. at
756.
16Brief for Petitioner at 4, Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982).
' 102 S. Ct. at 756-57.

20 Americans United, with a membership of 90,000, is a nonprofit, tax-exempt organization
with a stated purpose "to defend, maintain, and promote religious liberty and the principle of
separation of church and state." Brief for Respondents, supra note 15, at 7.
22 102 S. Ct. at 757. Although other religious organizations had also been the beneficiaries of
the federal government's largesse under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act,
this action had apparently never been challenged prior to commencement of this suit. See
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Health,
Educ. & Welfare, 619 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982).
" 102 S. Ct. at 757.
, Id. The District Court opinion has not been reported.
" Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Health,
Educ. & Welfare, 619 F.2d 252, 260 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982). The
court stated that under Flastv. Cohen, a plaintiff suing solely as a taxpayer could only challenge
congressional exercises of the taxing and spending power. 619 F.2d at 260.
,s Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Health,
Educ. & Welfare, 619 F.2d 252, 265 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982). The
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States granted certiorari2 8 to examine what it termed to be the Third
27
Circuit's "unusually broad and novel view of standing."
Before turning to the Court's decision, it will be useful to review
the general principles of the standing requirement. The doctrine of
standing is derived from the cases and controversies requirement of
article III of the Constitution.2 8 Although it has eluded a cogent
definition,2 9 standing has been held to require a "[c]oncrete injury," 0
the gist of which is "such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions."' 31 It is not clear
whether standing is mandated by article III or whether it is a prudential limitation; 32 nevertheless, it is a threshold requirement for every
plaintiff in federal court. The focus of the standing inquiry is "on the
party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on
court held that the establishment clause creates a constitutional right in every citizen to be free
from a government that establishes a religion. Id.
[C]ertain ...constitutional provisions, such as the First Amendment, create legal
rights in individuals. Yet, unless individuals averring an encroachment of their legal
rights have some recourse other than the political process for the vindication and
protection of those rights, the proud claim that individual citizens have rights against
the government may be emptied of significance.
Id.
U Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 450 U.S. 909 (1981).
102 S.Ct. at 757.
Association of Data Processing Service Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970). The "'cases
or controversies" requirement reads as follows:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; -to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof,
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.
1.
Standing is but one element of the case or controversy doctrine. The other elements are
ripeness, mootness, advisory opinion, political question, and collusive suits. For a general
discussion of the doctrine under the case or controversy doctrine, see L. TRiBE, AmmuCAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 3-7 to -16 (1978).
20 According to one commentator, the doctrine of standing is so confused that it has become
"little more than a set of disjointed rules dealing with a common subject." Tushnet, The New
Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 663 (1977).
30Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 (1974).
31 Baker v..Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
32See Flast,392 U.S. at 93-94. Compareid. with Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975),
which states that standing "involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction
and prudential limitations on its exercise." For the view that standing is not a constitutional
requirement, see Berger, supra note 1.
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the issues he wishes to have adjudicated." 33 The modern interpretation of standing is described in Association of Data ProcessingService
Organizationsv. Camp.3 4 The Court in Data Processing ruled that
the challenged action must have caused the plaintiff "injury in fact,
economic or otherwise,

'3 5

to an interest which was "arguably within

the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee" in question. 36 Furthermore, the Court has
added the requirement that the "injury in fact" be traceable "to the
challenged action of the defendant."

37

Moreover, a plaintiff must

allege an individual injury to his own interest, not a mere common
38

view as to the constitutionality of a law.

Frothinghamv. Mellon 39 was the first case to consider the status
of taxpayer standing in challenges to allegedly unconstitutional congressional action. The taxpayer-plaintiff in Frothingham alleged that
the Maternity Act of 192140 was unconstitutional in that it would
increase the burden of future taxation depriving her of her property in
violation of due process of law. 4 1 The Court refused to recognize
taxpayer suits, holding that the interest of an individual federal taxpayer in the United States treasury is a shared one with all taxpayers,
and the effect on future taxation is too "remote, fluctuating and
3 392 U.S. at 99. The court, however, must look at the substantive issues to decide whether
there is a logical nexus between taxpayer status and the alleged claim. Id. at 101-02.
1' 397 U.S. 150 (1970). DataProcessing modified the "legal interest" test as used in Tennessee
Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137 (1939) and Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S.
113, 125 (1940). The legal interest theory evolved because the Court was concerned that
sovereign immunity presented a barrier to actions against the government. Standing was justified
because the individual's cause of action could be analogized to one available at common law
against a private party. Thus, this theory "view[ed] the action as one for redress of a private
wrong, thereby placing on defendants the burden of justifying their conduct under the authority
of some constitutionally valid statute." Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional
Analysis, 86 H~av. L. REv. 645, 650 (1973).
23 397 U.S. at 152. Although the most common injury is economic, there can be noneconomic injuries, for example, environmental injury as in United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 727 (1972). Environmental injury was first
validated in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), although standing was denied because
the club failed to allege a personal injury to its members.
3 397 U.S. at 153.
37 Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976). For the view that
Simon operates as a narrowing of the "injury in fact" requirement, see Sedler, Standing and the
Burger Court: An Analysis and Some Proposalsfor Legislative Reform, 30 Rtrrenms L. REv. 863,
873-74 (1977).
' Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972).
32 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
40 Maternity Act of 1921, Ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224. The plaintiff in Frothinghamalleged that
the statute, which provided federal funds to states in order to improve infant and maternal
health, exceeded Congress power under article I and, therefore, it violated the tenth amendment's reservation of local governance for the states.
41 262 U.S. at 486.
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uncertain" to be the basis of a challenge to an unconstitutional enact42

ment.
Flast v. Cohen43 lowered the barrier erected by Frothinghamby
allowing taxpayer challenges to establishment clause violations. 44 In
Flast, the Court was faced with a challenge to Titles I and II of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 45 which allowed

educational expenditures to parochial schools. The taxpayers in Flast
alleged that this violated the establishment clause of the Constitu-

tion. 48 The Court found that the taxpayers had standing and in so
doing created a two-part nexus-test for taxpayer suits. 4 7 The taxpayer

must first establish that the exercise of congressional power is pursuant
to the taxing and spending clause of article I, section 8 of the Constitution. 48 Secondly, the taxpayer must show that the challenged action
violates "specific constitutional limitations" on the congressional taxing and spending power. 49 Having determined that the establishment

clause was a specific constitutional limitation on the congressional
taxing and spending power, 50 the Court found that a taxpayer qua
taxpayer has "a clear stake" in preventing the breach of this limitation
through the expenditure of tax monies.51
42

Id. at

487. Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952), also held that a taxpayer's

claimed injury of an unconstitutional expenditure for Bible reading in state public schools was
insufficient to confer standing. The Court found that the injury was a religious difference only
and that no "dollars-and-cents injury" was alleged. Id. at 433-34.
43 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
44 Float did not overrule Frothingham. Flast "decide[d] whether the Frothingham barrier
should be lowered when a taxpayer attacks a federal statute on the ground that it violates the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment." Id. at 85. In fact, the Float
Court found that the decision in Frothingham was consistent with the test as announced by
Flast.Id. at 104. The plaintiff in Frothinghamfailed to meet the second prong of the test; that is,
her attack was not based on a breach of a limitation upon the power to tax and spend. Id. at 105.
45 Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Public Law No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27
(current version codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 2711-2854, 3082-3086 (Supp. 111978)). The plaintiff
claimed that funds were being disbursed to finance education in and purchase textbooks for
religious schools in violation of the establishment clause of the first amendment. 392 U.S. at 8586.
4 392 U.S. at 87.
17 Id. at 102-03. Whether "individuals who assert only the status of federal taxpayers and
who challenge the constitutionality of a federal spending program ... have standing to maintain that form of action turns on whether they can demonstrate the necessary stake as taxpayers
in the outcome of the litigation to satisfy Article III requirements." Id. at 102.
48 Id. at 102. The Court added that "[ilt will not be sufficient to allege an incidental
expenditure of tax funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory statute." Id.
49 Id. at 102-03.
s0 Id. at 104. "Our history vividly illustrates that one of the specific evils feared by those who
drafted the Establishment Clause and fought for its adoption was that the taxing and spending
power would be used to favor one religion over another or to support religion in general." Id. at
103; see also Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 39-41 (1947).

31 392 U.S. at 105. See J.

VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY: THE COMING OF AcE IN PUBLIc LAW

125

(1978), for the view that the Flast decision "was wordplay, to hide acknowledgment that the
persons before the Court 'were' secularists and that the threat to secularism was what moved the
Court to see a role for itself."
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The Court has not been willing to extend the Flast nexus test to
constitutional mandates other than the establishment clause. In
United States v. Richardson,52 the Court determined that taxpayers

had no standing to challenge certain provisions of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 19495 3 allowing the CIA to withhold public
reporting of expenditures as violative of the accounts clause of article
4 The majority opinion held that the plaintiff had failed
I, section 9.5
to meet the Flast test because the challenge was not to an exercise of

congressional power taken pursuant to the taxing or spending

power. 55 In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,5

the Supreme Court rejected a taxpayer suit challenging Armed Forces
Reserve status for members of Congress as a violation of the incompatibility clause of article I, section 6.57 The plaintiffs in Schlesinger
likewise failed to satisfy the requirements of the nexus test. 58 Thus,
the Court has established that standing to sue as a taxpayer can only

be premised on a constitutional limitation on the taxing and spending
power, and it has thus far found that only the establishment clause
can act as such a constitutional limitation.

Valley Forge is the first case since Flast v. Cohen to deal with
taxpayer suits alleging congressional action as violative of the establishment clause. The Supreme Court in Valley Forge reversed the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and held that

Americans United had no standing to challenge the actions taken by
HEW either as taxpayers 59 or under any other theory of standing.60
52

418 U.S. 166 (1974).

s150 U.S.C. §§ 403a-403j (1976).
-" "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations
made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all
public Money shall be published from time to time." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.7.
5 418 U.S. at 175. The Court also found lack of a personal injury. Thus, the respondents'
interest was a generalized grievance, and
[w]hile ... this respondent has a genuine interest in the use of funds and . .. his
interest may be prompted by his status as a taxpayer, he has not alleged that, as a
taxpayer, he is in danger of suffering any particular concrete injury as a result of the
operation of this statute.
Id. at 177.
W 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
3 The incompatibility clause states:
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be
appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall
have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during
such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a
Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
51 418 U.S. at 228. The requirements of Flast were not met because the respondents challenged executive branch action permitting congressmen to maintain their Armed Forces Reserve
status. Id.
51 102 S. Ct. at 763. The Third Circuit court also held that Americans United had no
standing as taxpayers. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc. v. United States
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Noting that the cases and controversies requirement of the Constitution required "a concrete factual context' 61 within which to review a
challenged action, rather than the "rarified atmosphere of a debating
society,"'6 2 the Court found that Americans United failed to meet the
two-part nexus test of Flast v. Cohen.63 Americans United were
thereby barred as taxpayers from challenging HEW's gratuitous conveyance of the seventy-seven acre tract to Valley Forge Christian

College.64 In addition, Americans United lacked standing as citizens
to ensure that their government did not violate constitutional princi65
ples.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, began his discussion
of the standing requirement by noting that the Supreme Court has not
always made clear whether standing is inherently required by article
III or whether it is a policy consideration created by the Court.6 0
Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 619 F.2d 252, 260 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nor. Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 102 S. Ct.
752 (198,2); see also supra note 24 and accompanying text.
10 102 S. Ct. at 764. What is also significant about Valley Forge is that had standing been
found for Americans United, the conveyance to Valley Forge Christian College would not have
met the holding of Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
Tilton involved federal grants to four sectarian colleges pursuant to the Higher Education
Facilities Act of 1963. Tilton upheld these grants because the sectarian affiliations were not
found to interfere with their secular functions. Id. at 679. The five projects included a library
building at Sacred Heart University, an arts building at Annhurst College, a science building and
a library building at Fairfield University, and a language laboratory at Albertus Magnus
College. Id. at 676. The Court, however, did find unconstitutional that portion of the statute
which gave the government a right to recover the property in 20 years if a prohibition against
religious use was violated. Id. at 633. The Court said that this 20 year limitation violated the
establishment clause. Id. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, said:
Limiting the prohibition for religious use of the structure to 20 years obviously
opens the facility to use for any purpose at the end of that period. It cannot be
assumed that a substantial structure has no value after that period and hence the
unrestricted use of a valuable property is in effect a contribution of some value to a
religious body.. . . If, at the end of 20 years, the building is, for example, converted
into a chapel or otherwise used to promote religious interests, the original federal
grant will in part have the effect of advancing religion.
Id.
In Valley Forge, the Government's grant of a 100% public benefit allowance in exchange
for Valley Forge Christian College's assurance that the property would be used for certain
nonsectarian purposes for a period of 30 years, 102 S.Ct. at 756, did not accord with the Tilton
holding that restricted use of the property for a stated period violated the establishment clause.
61 102 S. Ct. at 758.
62 Id.

63 Id. at 762.
6 Id.
6 Id. at 764. The Court found that "assertion of a right to a particular kind of government
conduct, which the government has violated by acting differently, cannot alone satisfy the
requirements of Art. III without draining those requirements of meaning." Id.
0 102 S. Ct. at 758; see supra note 32. Apart from the cases or controversies requirement in
article III of the Constitution, the Court has formulated a set of "prudential principles" designed
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Despite this uncertainty, the Court observed that a plaintiff is still
required to suffer actual injury as a result of the defendant's illegal
conduct.8 7 Furthermore, this injury must be likely to be redressed by
a favorable judgment.68 These requirements are underscored by the
judiciary's "due regard for the autonomy of those persons likely to be
most directly affected by a judicial order,"89 lest the federal courtrooms are to become platforms to air public grievances. 70 The majority was also concerned with the judiciary's role in the tripartite system
of government,'71 despite the fact that judicial review
might ultimately
72
be a vindication of the rights of the individual.
Turning to the major standing cases, the Court cited
73

Frothinghamv. Mellon as the general rule regarding taxpayer suits.

A direct injury was required to confer standing on a plaintiff, and the
alleged injury from the burden of federal taxation7 4 was, as the
Frothinghamdecision made plain, too remote to ever be the basis for
standing. 75 The majority viewed Flastv. Cohen as forming an exception to Frothingham only in very limited circumstances. 76 Thus, a
taxpayer can only challenge congressional actions taken pursuant to
the taxing and spending clause of the Constitution, and there must be
a showing that the challenged statute exceeded a constitutional limita-

to limit access to the federal judiciary beyond the strictures of article III. Thus, a plaintiff may
not claim a generalized grievance common to a large group of citizens as a basis for his standing;
nor may a plaintiff claim the rights of a third party. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
The fear, according to the Warth decision, is that "courts would be called upon to decide
abstract questions of wide public significance even though other governmental institutions may
be more competent to address the questions and even though judicial intervention may be
unnecessary to protect individual rights." Id. at 500. However, such prudential considerations
may not supersede actual and direct injury. 102 S. Ct. at 760.
102 S. Ct. at 758 (citing Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979)).
8 102 S. Ct. at 758 (citing Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976)).
102 S. Ct. at 759.
...
Id.
7
The Court in Frothinghamsaid that to grant jurisdiction to taxpayer suits "would . . . not
[be] to decide a judicial controversy, but to assume a position of authority over the governmental
acts of another and coequal department, an authority which plainly we do not possess." 262 U.S.
at 489. The Flast decision, however, points out the error in the belief that the separation of
powers doctrine is imperiled by allowing a taxpayer to have standing. By itself, a resolution of
the standing question does not interfere with the separation of powers because standing is not a
decision on the substantive issues. Flast. 392 U.S. at 100-01.
"l 102 S. Ct. at 759. The Court claimed that judicial review is a tool of last resort otherwise it
would erode the effectiveness of the courts' power of review as a means of protecting individual
rights. Id.
11 Id. at 761.
71 Although Frothingham refused to recognize federal taxpayer standing, it recognized the
interest of a municipal taxpayer in the expenditure of tax monies. 262 U.S. at 486.
7S Id. at 487.
102 S. Ct. at 763.
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tion on the taxing and spending power.77 According to the majority,
Americans United failed to meet the first prong of the Flasttest in two
ways. They were challenging an agency decision, whereas Flast required that a congressional action be challenged in order to award
standing to a taxpayer. 78 In addition, Americans United were complaining about an exercise of authority conferred by the property
clause 79 rather than by the taxing and spending clauseA0 The Court
noted that its view of Flast as an exception to Frothingham was
bolstered by the more recent decisions of Richardson and Schlesinger
in which the taxpayer-plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to
challenge actions pursuant to the taxing and spending power. 8'
Finally, the Court assessed whether Americans United had any
other basis for standing. Justice Rehnquist noted that the Supreme
Court has never allowed standing to be based on a citizen's right to a
government administered according to the law.82 The majority then
dismissed the Third Circuit court's attempt to distinguish between
such generalized citizen standing and the supposed more individual
right created by the establishment clause to a government that does
not promote religion. 83 This distinction, said the Court, rested on
mere factual and not legal differences.8 4 The majority opinion
viewed the holding by the court of appeals as an attempt "to create a
hierarchy of constitutional values." 85 But the Court held that the
case or controversy requirement does not expand and contract as the
importance of the claim increases and diminishes. 88 Furthermore,
77 Id. at 762-63.

"sId. at 762. The majority failed to deal with the fact that Flast involved actions taken by
the Commissioner of Education. 392 U.S. at 86.
79 U.S. CONsr.art. IV, § 3, cl.
2. The property clause states: "The Congress shall have Power
to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States." Id.
80 102 S. Ct. at 762.
SI Id. at 763. Richardson involved statutes governing the CIA, 418 U.S. at 149, and Schlesinger involved reserve commissions given by the executive branch to Congressmen, 418 U.S. at
212. Challenges to the taxing and spending power were not involved.
82 Id. at 764. The Court pointed out that such standing would convert the federal courts into
a forum for the airing of generalized grievances concerning governmental conduct. Id.
83 Id.; see supra note 25.
1 102 S. Ct. at 764.
s Id. at 769. Thus,
Schlesinger and Richardson [cannot] be distinguished on the ground that the Incompatibility and Accounts Clauses are in some way less 'fundamental' than the Establishment Clause. Each establishes a norm of conduct which the federal government
is bound to honor-to no greater or lesser extent than ahy other inscribed in the
Constitution.
Id. at 764.
80 Id. at 765.
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the establishment clause has no talismanic effect over the requirement
of personal injury. 87 Thus, in order to obtain standing, one must
allege a personal injury. An alleged injury that the government has
not conformed to the Constitution is not sufficient and is no more so
when the claim involves the establishment clause.
Justice Brennan's dissent 88 focused on the unique place of the
establishment clause as a limitation on the disposition of tax funds.
According to Justice Brennan, Frothingham must be seen as denying
taxpayer standing when that standing intrudes on the legislative
branch's as well as the executive branch's exclusive power to determine the purpose of the taxation. 89 In light of the unique place of the
establishment clause,90 the holding in Frothinghamis necessarily limited with regard to taxpayer suits. 91 The lesson of history is that the
establishment clause was enacted in order to prohibit taxation for
religious purposes.92 Therefore, the federal taxpayer is the proper
party to challenge government support of religion in violation of the
establishment clause.
The federal taxpayer has a special role and this was brought out
by Flast, according to the dissent. Flast was an attempt to enforce the
framers' intent with regard to taxpayer suits. 93 The two-part nexus
The Court added,
[Tihe philosophy that the business of the federal courts is correcting constitutional
errors, and that "'casesand controversies" are at best merely convenient vehicles for
doing so and at worst nuisances that may be dispensed with when they become
obstacles to that transcendent endeavor . . . has no place in our constitutional
scheme. It does not become more palatable when the underlying merits concern the
Establishment Clause.
Id. at 767.
61Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun joined Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion. Justice
Stevens filed a separate dissent which agreed fundamentally with Justice Brennan's dissent and
added that there was no 'difference between a disposition of funds pursuant to the Spending
Clause and a disposition of realty pursuant to the Property Clause" in light of the fact that the
establishment clause is a specific constitutional limitation. Id. at 781 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" 102 S.Ct. at 772-73 (Brennan, J., dissenting). A federal taxpayer does not have a
continuing interest in the disposition of his tax monies. Thus, a taxpayer may not use the courts
to object to the use of tax funds. Id. at 773 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'0The dissenters refused to rule out the possibility that there are other specific limitations on
the taxing and spending power besides the establishment clause. Id. at 777 n. 18 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 773 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
IId. at 775 (Brennan, J.,dissenting) (citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)).
Justice Black, writing for the majority in Everson, reviewed at length the environment of the
times that bred the establishment clause. 330 U.S. at 8-13. He concluded that "[n]o tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion." Id. at 16;
see also MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUs AssEssMENTs, reprintedin id. at 6372.
9, 102 S.Ct. at 776-77 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
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test announced by the Flast majority balanced the interests of the
citizen alleging taxpayer status to challenge a violation of the establishment clause with the Court's developing view of taxpayer standing. 94 Flast was consistent with the principle "that no judgment
about standing should be made without a fundamental understanding
of the rights at issue."'9 5 Justice Brennan's concern was that the
majority's attempt to resolve these cases at the threshold overlooked
the need to give full consideration to the constitutional protections
involved.9 8 The dissenters thus charged the majority with ignoring
the constitutional heritage by making a determination that Americans
United lacked standing without considering the special role of the
establishment clause. Moreover, to suggest that the Flast nexus test
was not met because Americans United challenged the acts of an
agency rather than congressional action 9 7 and because the statute
involved was an exercise of congressional power under the property
clause rather than the taxing and spending clause 8 was specious,
according to Justice Brennan, and therefore, the majority failed to
explain why Valley Forge and Flast were not alike. 9
In Valley Forge, as in Flast before it, the Court was presented
with "a situation without identifiable victims."10 0 When a constitutional mandate is violated there is not always a specific victim, but
that does not mean that no injury has been suffered. As one commentator has stated, the establishment clause, unlike some other constitutional provisions, was intended to protect a minority, in this case a
religious minority.' 0 ' "The use of the governmental process to foster
religious beliefs antithetical to some citizens violates the rights of those
94 Id.
at 777 (Brennan, J.,dissenting); see, e.g., Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429,
433-34 (1952) (limiting taxpayer suits to those involving expenditure of funds). See supra note 42.
42.
"s 102 S. Ct. at 777 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 768 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Justice Brennan's opinion, the majority failed to
consider the establishment clause right itself while they discussed at length the standing requirement. Id.
97 Id. at 778 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see supra note 78.
98 102 S. Ct. at 779 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
99 Id. at 778 (Brennan, J., dissenting). According to Justice Brennan:
The Framers of the First Amendment could not have viewed it as less objectionable
to the taxpayer to learn that his tax funds were used by his government to purchase
property, construct a church, and deed the property to a religious order, than to find
his government providing the funds to a church to undertake its own construction.
So far as the Establishment Clause, and the position of the taxpayers are concerned,
the situations are interchangeable.
Id. at 779 n.20 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100Bogen, Standing Up for Flast: Taxpayer and Citizen Standing to Raise Constitutional
Issues, 67 Ky. L.J. 147, 170 (1978).
10,Id. at 169-70.
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persons (presumably a minority) to be free of governmental aid to
opposing religious viewpoints."' 02 Flast is reflective of this desire to
protect the taxpaying minority;10 3 Valley Forge strips this constitutional guarantee of its strength. Valley Forge clearly limits Flast to its
facts. The very plaintiffs that Flast set out to protect, that is, those
who seek to prevent use of their tax monies for religious purposes, are
effectively precluded from bringing an action in all but the rarest of
circumstances.
The majority's attempt to distinguish Flast rests on specious
grounds. The Court viewed as determinative the fact that Americans
United was challenging executive action rather than legislative action
as required by Flast,10 4 yet the majority ignored that Flast itself
involved a taxpayer challenge to actions taken by the Commissioner of
Education. 0 5 As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, "it is difficult
to conceive of an expenditure for which the last governmental actor,
either implementing directly the legislative will, or acting within the
scope of legislatively delegated authority, is not an Executive Branch
official." 0 6 Constitutional prohibitions do not focus on the legislative
branch only; the Constitution seeks to limit all governmental excesses.10 7 The Valley Forge decision holds that an agency may accomplish indirectly that which Congress may not do directly. Thus, the
executive branch, which has the authority to enforce the law, may
now also circumvent it.
The Court's reliance on Schlesinger and Richardson is also misplaced. Neither one of these cases involved a challenge to the taxing
and spending power.' 0 8 The logical nexus between taxpayer status
and the constitutional infringement was missing in both instances.

112 Id. Since government aid to religions, according to Professor Bogen, is the type of injury
which the United States Constitution sought to prevent, then those who oppose such aid should
have standing to contest it. And when the injury is caused by "Flast-type expenditures," then the
individual taxpayer is the best victim. id.
,0 See suipra text accompanying notes 93-95.
,04102 S. Ct. at 762.
10

See 392 U.S. at 85-86; see also supra note 78.

10'102 S. Ct. at 779 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
0""Id. According to Justice Brennan,
[Tihe First Amendment is phrased as a restriction on Congress' legislative authority;
this is only natural since the Constitution assigns the authority to legislate and
appropriate only to the Congress . . . .The First Amendment binds the Covernment
as a whole, regardless of which branch is at work in a particular instance.
Id.
JosSchlesinger involved a challenge to an executive branch decision allowing Congressmen to
retain their Armed Forces Reserve status, 418 U.S. at 212, and Richardson involved a challenge
to a statute allowing the CIA to withhold information regarding its expenditures, 418 U.S. at
149; see also supra text accompanying notes 52-58.
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With regard to taxpayer standing, they held only that a taxpayer has
no standing to assert that a non-taxing or non-spending constitutional
proscription has been violated. 109 Valley Forge, however, did involve
an expenditure-the purchase of property later donated by the federal
government to a religiously affiliated organization-and it thus was a
violation of the limits imposed by the establishment clause.
In addition, the Court relied on another false distinction. The
majority found that Americans United did not base its complaint on
the taxing and spending power but rather on an agency action taken
pursuant to a statute enacted under the property clause." 0 There is
no distinction between property conveyed gratuitously to a religiously
affiliated college and a purchase of and subsequent grant of, for
example, textbooks to the same institution. Funds have been expended
in both situations. There is just as logical a nexus between taxpayer
status and the conveyance of property by the government as there is
between taxpayer status and government spending under the taxing
and spending clause.
Although religious interests may have motivated Americans
United in bringing this action, the financial impact of a gratuitous
conveyance serves as the nexus providing the real stake. And although
"'a citizen [be forced] to contribute three pence only of his property
for
the support of any one establishment,"' I the expenditure of tax monies to promote sectarian education is repugnant to the Constitution.
The government has effectively spent tax monies to benefit an admittedly fundamentalist Christian organization, yet taxpayers are not
given the opportunity to challenge this expenditure. 112 This is despite
the special place of the establishment clause in the scheme of the
United States Constitution." 3 The framers clearly intended that tax
4
monies should not be used to foster religion."
If these taxpayers do not have standing under Flast because the
taxing and spending power has not been the underlying authorization
of the governmental actor, then Flasthas been inferentially overruled.
In its zeal to keep the Court above the political fray, the majority
"' For example, the Court in Richardson limited Flast to situations in which the taxpayerplaintiff proved that the expenditure violated a specific constitutional limitation on the taxing
and spending power. 418 U.S. at 174-78. Only the establishment clause has been found to be
such a limitation.
110 102 S. Ct. at 762.
III
MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINsT REucious AssEssMENTs

3, reprintedin Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1947).
.. It is also probable that tax monies will be spent in the monitoring of Valley Forge Christian
College's secular curriculum as represented in the college's application for the tract of land. See
supra note 17.
113 See supra text accompanying notes 90-92.
14 See supra note 92.
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severely limits the second prong of the Flast nexus test." 5 Valley
Forge, thus, follows in the path of recent Burger Court decisions
which have chipped away at the liberalization of the standing requirement to make it into a formidable bar to judicial review, especially in
the context of public actions.""
The Valley Forge decision is another step in the erosion of standing to challenge allegedly unconstitutional governmental excesses.
Flast was very explicit in its holding that a taxpayer may challenge
expenditures allegedly violating the establishment clause because of
that provision's unique role as a limitation on the taxing and spending
power. 71 Richardson and Schlesinger are not inconsistent with this
thinking." 8 These later cases do not expand the list of specific constitutional limitations, but neither do they inhibit taxpayer suits involving taxing and spending in violation of the establishment clause. The
majority in Valley Forge attempts to say that because the Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act was enacted on the authority of the property clause of the Constitution, that no taxing or spending power was involved. 119 This simply does not follow and is merely
ipse dixit logic, not representative of the realities of the situation.
Valley Forge, therefore, should be seen for what it is, the conservatism of a majority that wants to limit the availability of the
Court to cases with which it feels ideologically comfortable. In the
wake of Valley Forge, a taxpayer who is aggrieved by the use of tax
monies for the establishment of religion may only be heard by a
federal court if the statute under which the expenditure is made can
be proven to have been enacted under the taxing and spending clause
itself. 20 Even though the action may not in reality be taken without
the use of the taxing and spending power, if the statute was promulgated pursuant to some other constitutional clause the taxpayer-plaintiff will have no standing to be heard.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court's analysis ignores the unique
role of the establishment clause as a limitation on the government's
expenditure of tax monies. This would not create a hierarchy of
constitutional values; it would restate the obvious, that the framers of
'1s See supra text accompanying note 49.
'16 See generally Sedler, supra note 37.
"17 392 U.S. at 103-04.
118See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
"

See supra note 80.

Apparently the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia thought that
Valley Forge only limited Flast to suits involving the taxing and spending clause and did not
otherwise reduce the scope of Flast. Murray v. Buchanan, 674 F.2d 14, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Thus, taxpayers had standing to challenge the government's paying of congressional chaplains.
Id. at 16.
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the United States Constitution were concerned lest the federal government use treasury monies to foster the advancement of religion. It
would have been more reasonable for the Court to recognize that
there are some congressional actions which are not authorized by the
taxing and spending clause but which, nonetheless, involve the taxing
and spending power. Viewing the establishment clause as a limitation
on the use of tax funds is consonant with this intent and is an effective
rein on unconstitutional excesses in the guise of seemingly innocuous
governmental largesse.
Donna L. Passero

